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The Downfall of General Giraud
On April 17, 1942, a man escaped from his prison at Konigstein by 
lowering himself down the castle wall and jumping on board a train that took 
him to the French border. In November of that year, he donned an elderly 
lady’s garb and pulled off another dramatic escape from France to Algiers.1 
The arrival of this man, French General Henri Giraud, in Algiers marked 
the beginning of a power struggle between General Charles de Gaulle and 
General Giraud for control of the French resistance forces in French North 
Africa. This personal duel and power struggle involved not only the French, 
but also the active and repeated intervention of the British and American 
governments. The United States, under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
maintained a narrow-minded stance in favor of General Giraud, a position 
which caused the ouster of their favored general by General de Gaulle in the 
struggle to control the French resistance forces in North Africa.
In early 1943, Roosevelt’s held an idealistic assessment of the political 
situation of France, commenting in a conversation with General Giraud on 
January 17, 19432 that he believed that the sovereignty of France rested with the 
people. FDR further argued that from a legal and constitutional standpoint, 
there could be “no change in the French civil set-up until such time as the 
people of France were able to exercise their inherent rights in this regard.” In 
other words, as Roosevelt retorted when General de Gaulle mentioned the 
sovereignty of French Morocco,3 neither de Gaulle nor Giraud could claim 
to represent the sovereignty of France. Given the German invasion of France 
and the subsequent establishment of the Nazi-backed Vichy regime in France, 
President Roosevelt correctly judged that the French people would not be 
able to exercise their sovereign rights. However, as the war wore on, President 
Roosevelt based the stance of the United States on this narrow judgment, 
which turned out to be too narrow-minded.
First, President Roosevelt erred by comparing French sovereignty to that 
of United States. The Roosevelt Administration tended to view political 
power in France along the lines of its own post-Civil War voting coalition,4 
a situation that led to a distorted American understanding of the sources of 
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political power in the French political landscape. The British, who stood as 
the strongest ally of the United States during the war, arrived at the conclusion 
during a War Cabinet meeting in June 21, 1943 that US assessments of the 
French political situation could not be trusted because “[the Americans] knew 
nothing about France.5” 
By single-mindedly claiming that the French could not exercise their 
sovereignty before the war had concluded, the United States failed to 
consider the continuity that would exist between the French North African 
administration and postwar France. The US Administration seemed to ignore 
the notion that a candidate who enjoyed a greater popularity at home would 
be most capable of exerting power when France regained her freedom after the 
war. General de Gaulle was that candidate – he enjoyed a substantial support 
base in metropolitan France gained due to his efforts to rally the Fighting 
French instead of collaborating with the Vichy regime. De Gaulle’s base of 
support included every major party, trade union and resistance organization 
in France.6 The activism of de Gaulle’s supporters did not go unnoticed by 
the British, who noted that “the de Gaullist correspondents had been more 
active in the press than those who supported General Giraud,” resulting in a 
perception that newspaper correspondents were disposed to take a view which 
favored the former.7
In contrast to de Gaulle’s wide base of support, General Giraud struggled to 
establish a broad-based coalition. Giraud drew his strongest support from his 
fellow generals and senior officers in the army, but this once-powerful group 
lost influence after French military’s collapse in the face of German invasion. 
The ambiguous stance of General Giraud toward the Vichy government, 
combined with his lack of vision for France’s political future caused Giraud 
to be labeled “a compromise candidate.”8 In a conversation with American 
General Wilbur on January 23, 1943, General de Gaulle pointed out that 
General Giraud could not represent the people of France because he was 
voted into power by Nogues, Boisson and Chatel, all members of the Vichy 
government.9 President Roosevelt did not view the popularity of either 
general as a determining factor behind backing a post-war French leadership, 
as FDR did not believe in the continuity between the French North African 
command and a postwar French government.
Based on the belief that France could not exercise sovereignty before the 
war ended, the United States decided that the liberation of France should be 
a military objective and not a political one.10 Other factors also contributed 
to this view – the United States maintained plans to occupy France after its 
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The captured French General Giraud, during his daily walk. Germany, 
ca. 1940-41.
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liberation, and had already set up a school in Charlottesville for this purpose. 
In any case, the military approach to France’s liberation led to an American 
preference for General Giraud as the leader of the French resistance after the 
assassination of Admiral Darlan, the High Commissioner of France for North 
and West Africa. As a five-star general, Giraud enjoyed the support of the 
entire French military, while the French army in North Africa would not 
submit to de Gaulle’s command because of his two-star rank.11 Second, the 
United States remained wary of the political ambitions held by General de 
Gaulle, who disagreed with the American idea of a strictly military liberation 
campaign. The United States was not the only country that was wary of de 
Gaulle – Churchill had also expressed the view during a War Cabinet meeting 
on March 15, 1943 that de Gaulle had personal motives to have “the title-
deeds of France in his pockets.”12 In contrast to de Gaulle, General Giraud 
represented a consensus candidate for the Americans and British – he agreed 
with President Roosevelt’s view that the most important thing to do was to 
“get on with the war” and would not let the conflicting political situation 
divert him from the urgent task of liberating French territory from enemy 
control.13
During his meeting with General de Gaulle on January 22, 1943, 
President Roosevelt expressed his view that there existed no irreconcilable 
differences between Giraud and de Gaulle. In hindsight, Roosevelt’s belief 
in the potential for reconciliation proved quite incorrect and idealistic 
– de Gaulle and Giraud could not bridge their differences in a number of 
critical areas. The administrative structure of the French resistance forces in 
North Africa was a key area of contention. General de Gaulle insisted that 
General Giraud should rally to the Fighting French, after which he could be 
appointed as a member of the French National Committee and command 
the forces. De Gaulle refused to compromise because he believed doing so 
would be “a disservice to France” because of Giraud’s cooperation with Vichy 
representatives.14 On the other hand, Giraud held a more flexible stance, 
even agreeing to a power-sharing agreement with de Gaulle.15 In the end, 
efforts at reconciliation failed; instead, General de Gaulle worked to assert his 
dominance in the power struggle by leveraging his position on the military 
committee that had jurisdiction over all the fighting forces.
A simple comparison of the background and beliefs of both Giraud and 
de Gaulle would have made clear the impossibility of reconciliation between 
the two generals. General Giraud, who was already sixty years old by the 
time World War II began, was a five-star general in the French Army. He 
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was an authoritarian officer who believed in the military rank hierarchy. For 
example, Giraud informed Harold Macmillan, the British Resident-Minister 
in French North Africa, that he was confident of fruitful negotiations with 
de Gaulle since the latter served as a Colonel under his orders.16 In contrast, 
General de Gaulle positioned himself as an intellectual officer after labeling 
Giraud as a practical one. De Gaulle was never one to conform – as a junior 
officer he advocated the aggressive use of tanks, even though the French high 
command was opposed to the idea. He also criticized General Gamelin’s 
defensive strategy and advocated offensive tactics. After the war, de Gaulle 
placed the blame squarely on the highest ranks of the military for its failure to 
defend France against German invasion, instead of on the pre-war Republican 
government. All these views made de Gaulle unpopular with his superiors 
and peers in the army, a fact that did not appear to bother him in light of his 
rejection of the hierarchical structure of the military.17
The Vichy government was another area of substantial disagreement 
between de Gaulle and Giraud. General de Gaulle maintained a deep-seated 
resentment for the Vichy administration. On June 18, 1940, de Gaulle aired 
his views over the BBC, accusing Marshall Petain of inadequately preparing 
France for war and for seeking an armistice with the Germans. While in 
exile in Britain, General de Gaulle spent his energies organizing the French 
Resistance to liberate France from Vichy control. In the aforementioned 
conversation with General Wilbur, de Gaulle declared that the Fighting 
French represented the true France and held the responsibility of liberating 
the nation from Petain, who had become a “pale shadow” of the national hero 
he had been in World War I.18 General de Gaulle’s strong views in opposition 
to the Vichy gained him the support of French political leaders ranging from 
the communists and socialists on the left to members of the Action Française 
on the right. 
On the other hand, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs Eden 
characterized Giraud as trying to balance between the Fighting French and 
the Vichy government, resulting in Giraud having “no position at all” with 
regard to the legitimacy of the Vichy government.19  Giraud recognized no 
need to challenge the legal order imposed by the Vichy government, even 
though it had incarcerated thousands of Jews in concentration camps with 
the passage of its anti-Semitic laws.20 A benefit of this ambiguous position 
was that Giraud could appeal to the officers under Petain who retained power 
within the French Imperial Council as well as to the members of the political 
elite in French North Africa who wanted a break from the Petainist past 
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without accepting a Gaullist future. When tasked with dismantling the Vichy 
legal system in North Africa, Giraud proceeded with such a lack of urgency 
as to incur the irritation of the British.21 General Giraud was outspoken in 
his opposition to the Axis powers, despite his ambiguous stance on the Vichy 
government. As a side note, the United States, like Giraud, showed tolerance 
towards the Vichy government – a stance which paralleled the American 
dislike of de Gaulle’s French National Committee. Cordell Hull, the Secretary 
of State, claimed that relations with the Vichy government yielded important 
benefits, such as the opportunity to avoid prolonged military resistance to the 
landings during Operation Torch.22
For the United States, one idealistic belief led to another. President 
Roosevelt, in correspondence with Secretary of State Hull, outlined his plans 
for the French North Africa administration. Roosevelt quickly realized that 
General Giraud had no administrative ability, but at the same time, the 
French Army based in North Africa would not follow General de Gaulle’s 
orders. Speaking to General Giraud, President Roosevelt revealed plans to 
have him and General de Gaulle jointly handle the military situation in Africa 
by forming a three member “Committee for the Liberation of France” with 
a third leading civilian member.23 This plan seemed to represent an effective 
compromise agreement for leadership of postwar France, save for the fact 
that no suitable civilian could be found with a stature comparable to that of 
Giraud or de Gaulle.
President Roosevelt initially suggested Jean Monnet, but only because 
he had “kept his skirts clear of all political entanglements during the past 
two years”24 and would not oppose the American view that the liberation of 
France should above be a military objective. Cordell Hull exposed the bias in 
Roosevelt’s thinking in a respectful way, by reminding President Roosevelt 
that General Giraud’s membership on the British Purchasing Commission 
would “create doubts in a great many French minds.”25 Hull instead advocated 
Roger Cambon as for membership in the future French leadership tripartite, 
as someone with outstanding integrity and loyalty to all the “best elements” 
of France.
Roger Cambon appeared to be all things to all people. To the Americans, 
his father’s service in North Africa cemented his reputation in the region, 
while his impartial approach to French groups made him an ideal candidate 
for Roosevelt’s plans for the French North Africa administration. The British, 
during a War Cabinet meeting, further investigated Cambon’s political 
views and his leadership potential.26 Mr. Cambon had informed British 
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representatives that the rising Gaullism in the region had led to a credibility 
crisis for Giraud in Algiers. Despite holding this view, Cambon added 
that he had a bitter personal prejudice against de Gaulle and would say 
almost anything to discredit him. Indeed, Mr. Cambon’s personal enmity 
for de Gaulle may have persuaded the United States to push for Cambon’s 
membership on the proposed “Committee for the Liberation of France” as a 
tie-breaking counterbalance to de Gaulle’s influence. 
As it turned out, sources close to Cambon informed Cordell Hull that 
Cambon had been retired for some years and would be unwilling to accept 
the responsibilities that President Roosevelt had in mind for him. Hence, 
the United States placed their hopes on Leger, who had a greater experience 
in administration and had proved himself a supporter of Roosevelt’s policies 
in France and North Africa. Secretary Hull proposed a plan to hand the 
eager Leger the role as chief civil administrator, with Cambon installed as the 
Cambon’s advisor.27 Leger and Cambon were known to have a close personal 
relationship, and the Roosevelt Administration viewed such a union as the 
perfect plan for succession of the French North Africa administration.
In contrast to the United States, the British adopted a far more balanced 
stance in the power struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. The British, 
unlike the Americans, understood the continued influence of the French 
resistance in wartime France. Britain, given its geographical location and 
desire to maintain a close postwar relationship with France, feared being 
on the wrong side of a French postwar power struggle. This worry led 
the British to maintain a balanced stance throughout the power struggle 
between Giraud and de Gaulle. In a meeting between Churchill and the 
War Cabinet on April 11, 1944, the British spelled out their policy towards 
the question of Giraud or de Gaulle: they would attempt in all their power 
to maintain friendly relations between the two generals.28 The British held 
this stance until the end of war, even after General de Gaulle had established 
complete dominance over the French resistance forces, abolished the role 
of Commander-in-Chief held by General Giraud, and offered Giraud the 
insignificant post of Inspector-General. The British plan had always been 
to strengthen the power of the French Committee of National Liberation 
(FCNL) as a check to the de Gaulle’s power.29
Before de Gaulle established complete dominance over the French 
military, the British had refused to support the narrow anti-de Gaulle stance 
adopted by the United States. Churchill and his government understood 
that de Gaulle enjoyed a strong reputation throughout France as the spirit 
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of the Resistance.30 The British recognized that none of the other French 
leaders had “a prestige and position comparable with that held by General de 
Gaulle,”31 even though he had an attitude that made him difficult to work 
with. Hence, the British refused to pin all their hopes on Giraud despite the 
clear preference of their American allies for him. 
There were many instances when events tested the balanced stance of the 
British. In the prelude to the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, General 
de Gaulle recognized the importance of meeting General Giraud to develop 
a common platform for French Resistance, but was reluctant to do so under 
the auspices of an Allied forum. The British stepped in to show de Gaulle 
that they were committed to bridging the differences between de Gaulle and 
Roosevelt, taking pains to ensure that they would not be seen as dictating 
who should be the leader of the Fighting French movement.32 This approach 
appealed more to the senses of de Gaulle than the high-handed insistence of 
the United States that de Gaulle be present at the conference or pushed out 
of the running for leadership of the French North Africa administration. The 
British communicated the same message, but with their balanced stance they 
succeeded in encouraging de Gaulle to attend the Casablanca Conference. 
In another incident, General Eisenhower, for the purpose of coordinating 
military operations with the French Army based in North Africa, met with 
both generals on 19th June 1943 and insisted that the control of the French 
forces remain in the hands of Giraud. Although Eisenhower tried to deliver 
this message gently, his point angered General de Gaulle, who viewed 
Eisenhower’s demand as a breach of French sovereignty. Consistent with their 
balanced stance, the British chose to delay further discussions on this issue 
until the FCNL had reacted to Eisenhower’s statement.33
Who did the British prefer? This question can only be answered by 
peeling away the layers built up by their balanced stance and looking at the 
heart of their French policy. In a meeting on April 11, 1944, the British War 
Cabinet investigated the fundamentals of their policy on Giraud versus de 
Gaulle, concluding that they opposed General de Gaulle in full command of 
the French military. The British preferred to place General Giraud in charge 
of military affairs, believing that he had showed himself to be adaptable to 
persuasion, logic, and influence. Thus, the British decided that they would 
allow General de Gaulle to remain the joint President (with General Giraud) 
of the FCNL, so long as he did not gain lone command of the army.
Given that the British shared a dislike of General de Gaulle with the 
American administration, the reasons the British did not part with de Gaulle 
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present an interesting example of wartime pragmatism. The British War 
Cabinet meeting held on May 23, 1943 involved an extensive discussion 
of British policy vis-à-vis General de Gaulle.34 First, British sources at the 
time indicated  the existence of 80,000 Fighting French troops positioned in 
different parts of the world, a fact which complicated a break with de Gaulle 
because of the importance of these forces to British operations in French 
Equatorial Africa. Second, French Trade Unionists feared the increasing 
influence of the United States. The British, as an outgrowth of their fear of 
supporting the losing side in the wartime struggle to control the postwar 
French government, lent their support to the Fighting French because of 
the loyalty the resistance group commanded among the French trade unions 
and working class. In addition, the British believed that if they sided with 
Roosevelt and broke with de Gaulle, many Frenchmen opposed to de Gaulle 
would rally behind him as a show of national pride. This situation could 
have reinforced de Gaulle as the symbol of the Republic, backfiring on the 
potential plans of the British to isolate him. Moreover, if the British broke 
with General de Gaulle, their actions would be interpreted in the court of 
public opinion as a capitulation to the United States and a signal of British 
diplomatic weakness. The fact that de Gaulle sat in exile in London proved 
an additional complication to the British government’s ability to break 
with the Fighting French, as such a move would likely have harmed British 
credibility with other wartime allies. Although the United States did not 
allow the British to sway its stance on Giraud versus de Gaulle,35 the British 
did on many occasions weigh the American stance before setting its policy 
vis-à-vis the French Resistance. While the British were balanced in their 
support of de Gaulle and Giraud, the Americans were quite narrow-minded 
in their insistence on Giraud as their preferred leader of the FCNL. Little did 
the Americans expect that in the final power struggle, their narrow-minded 
support for Giraud would backfire against their preferred candidate and 
cause him to lose ground against de Gaulle.
General Giraud despite, or perhaps because of his military experience, 
was a malleable character whose beliefs could be easily influenced. Roosevelt 
and the British appreciated the pliability of Giraud; they realized that despite 
General Giraud’s status as a political neophyte, he “showed himself to be 
adaptable to persuasion, logic and influence.”36 Stemming from this belief in 
Giraud’s flexibility, the British trusted that it would be easy to alter Giraud’s 
ambiguous attitude toward the Vichy government, a stance which de Gaulle 
exploited in order to win the support of the French people against Giraud. 
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General Charles de Gaulle shaking the hand of General Henri Giraud 
in front of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at the Casablanca 
Conference (January 14, 1943)
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Roosevelt utilized General Giraud’s malleability in order to convince 
him of American plans for the French North Africa administration. FDR 
extended Giraud an invitation to the President’s villa for a discussion on 
January 17, 1943 of the American vision of postwar France. Although Giraud 
“habitually shied away” when a foreigner discussed the internal politics of 
France,37 Roosevelt’s stature as the President of the United States dissipated 
Giraud’s ego and convinced him to adopt Roosevelt’s judgment that the 
French people had to wait until the end of the war to exercise their sovereign 
rights.38 Convinced by Roosevelt’s view that the liberation of France should 
be a military objective, Giraud stated his belief that the most important 
and urgent goal of the French Resistance was to “get on with the war.”39 
When Giraud shared his plans for French North Africa with Catroux, the 
General emphasized the primary goal of the proposed FCNL: to wage war 
and attain victory against the Axis powers. General Giraud maintained that 
complications of war with the Axis made it impossible to have two French 
commanders in charge, and recommended himself for leadership because he 
had lived in France more recently than General de Gaulle and was thus more 
familiar with the situation in the country.40
The malleability of General Giraud’s beliefs made him the ideal candidate 
in Roosevelt’s eyes to lead the French forces in North Africa during the war. 
However, in molding Giraud into an ideal leader, Roosevelt caused him to be 
less capable of competing with de Gaulle for leadership of the French forces. 
Even barring Roosevelt’s influence, Giraud did not possess a strong, coherent 
vision of the postwar political situation in France. The only aspect of the 
Vichy government that Giraud felt strongly enough to condemn was its ties 
with the Axis powers. By convincing Giraud that the liberation of France 
should only be a military objective, Roosevelt painted in General Giraud’s 
an idealized notion of a quick liberation and transition to political stability. 
However, Roosevelt’s influence over Giraud in convincing him of the military 
nature of French liberation caused Giraud not to develop a coherent vision 
for the political future of postwar France, a great weakness for him in the 
power struggle with de Gaulle.
This gaping weakness was exploited by General de Gaulle in his political 
maneuvers against General Giraud. By consistently proclaiming his goal 
of overthrowing the Vichy government, de Gaulle rallied support from 
communists and socialists on the left and members of the Action Francaise 
on the right. By building a strong political coalition, de Gaulle wiped out 
the support base of his opponent Giraud, who ended up with “no effective 
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organization of loyal followers within France itself.”41 In other words, 
Roosevelt’s influence over Giraud left the American’s as his most influential 
and loyal supporters. 
Besides molding General Giraud’s views of French liberation in a manner 
that put him at a disadvantage to General de Gaulle, the narrow-minded 
stance of the United States also served to increase de Gaulle’s popularity. The 
British, understood the negative feelings among the French that arose from 
the US support for Giraud. In a meeting between Churchill and the War 
Cabinet on May 23, 1943, six months before Giraud lost his position as co-
President of the FCNL, the French Minister of Labor and National Service 
informed the British that the Trade Unionists had been showing “considerable 
fear of growing United States influence.”42 Although the unionists did not 
fully support General de Gaulle, the Fighting French movement enjoyed 
strong support among the French working class as the strongest resistance 
force. Hence, the negative perceptions that grew out of American support for 
Giraud hurt his reputation in France against the wily de Gaulle.
By June 1943, the British concluded that the American reputation in 
France stood at an all-time low.43 Churchill and his government attributed 
the unpopularity of the United States to their strong belief that the liberation 
of France should be a purely military objective, despite lacking American 
knowledge of domestic French politics. Roosevelt’s open anger at de Gaulle 
for the General’s expansion of the committee which presided over the 
administration of French North Africa only exacerbated tensions. The British 
linked the plummeting reputation of the United States in France to the rise in 
popularity of de Gaulle, and refused to break their relations with the General 
for fear of damaging their own reputation in France.
In July 1943, the British War Cabinet discussed another development in 
the struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. The United States government 
had been accused of leaking a public statement to the press in their attempt 
to break up the FCNL and remove General de Gaulle from power. The 
public statement revealed confidential information regarding Britain’s stance 
on the struggle between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. Churchill sent the 
secret document to Washington as a gesture of goodwill for the reference of 
Roosevelt, and was quite perturbed at the release of the document. The British 
government feared the leaked document would harm their relationship with 
the FCNL, especially at a time when the authority of the committee was 
increasing daily. This action by the United States ran the risk, the British 
believed, of further “strengthening de Gaulle’s position at the expense of the 
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Committee,”44 in particular because the United States suffered a declining 
reputation in France.
The traditional historiography of Giraud’s marginalization contends 
that de Gaulle’s vision for a postwar French government, combined with 
his strong anti-Vichy stance, allowed de Gaulle to outmaneuver his Giraud’s 
narrow focus on a military liberation. But the United States in fact holds 
responsibility for shaping Giraud’s narrow focus on the military aspects of 
liberation. Furthermore, the declining wartime reputation of the United 
States in France caused American support for Giraud to become a political 
liability in his power struggle with General de Gaulle. Despite the consistent 
support of the President Roosevelt for General Giraud, the American press 
often challenged the narrow approach of the Roosevelt Administration to 
France’s political future. The July 1943 issue of LIFE magazine features an 
article which discusses the pro-Giraud stance adopted by Roosevelt and the 
United States government on the leadership of the French Resistance in 
North Africa. The editors of the magazine believed that the United States 
was not “acting in its best interests” by supporting Giraud against de Gaulle. 
LIFE’s editorial staff argued that while General Giraud should earn the 
respect of the United States for his escape from German territory, Roosevelt’s 
insistence that the liberation of France should be a military pursuit was naïve 
because of the inevitable political implications of liberation. As a result of 
this insistence, the article argues, Roosevelt and the State Department based 
their policy on France on Roosevelt’s dislike for de Gaulle. Roosevelt it seems 
overlooked one key fact:  millions of Frenchmen and women “never stopped 
resisting the Germans.”45 This fact cemented de Gaulle’s popularity among 
the French people who disliked the Nazi-backed Vichy government. Thus, 
the narrow support of the United States for General Giraud, who had in 
fact never enjoyed a wide following in France or North Africa, caused the 
General’s downfall and the accompanying failure of US policy regarding 
France’s postwar leadership. 
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